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I. INTRODUCTION

The low-key arrival of Elian Gonzalez in Miami on Thanksgiving Day
1999,1 and the custody-immigration controversy that then ensued shortly
afterward,2 transfixed not only Miami and Havana but also the entire

* Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for Hispanic & Caribbean Legal Studies,
University of Miami. I thank the participants in the Faculty Seminar at Quinnipiac School of Law
and in the Colloquium at Harvard Law School, where drafts of this Essay were presented. I thank
also Carmen Gonzalez, Evelio Rodriguez, Ricardo Camara, Robert Westley, and Lisa Iglesias for
feedback that helped to develop the thoughts presented here. Finally, I thank the organizers,
participants and attendees of the Sixth Annual LatCrit Conference, and the editors and contributors
of this symposium, for providing a fitting venue and community for this rather personal Essay. All
errors are mine.
1. The arrival was reported in the local paper as yet another dramatic example of escape
from the island, with no inkling of the greater drama to follow. See Lisa Arthur et al., 5-Year-Old
Survivor Clung to Inner Tube, Two More Rafters Rescueed But 1) Other Cubans May Have Died
at Sea, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 26, 1999, at IA; see also Melissa Leavister, Ambiguity Equals
Authority: The ImmigrationandNaturalizationService'sResponse in the Elian Gonzalez Case, 31
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 219 (2001). Elian's case is not an isolated occurrence, although it has
been the most chronicled. See, e.g., Marika Lynch & Alfonso Chardy, Mother Indictedfor Taking
Son to Cuba,MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 24, 2001, at lB. Elian's notoriety apparently continues inCuba,
despite Cuba's criticism of the U.S. media circus surrounding Elian's story. Elian Featured in
Museum of Castro Doctrine,MIAMI HERALD, July 15, 2001, at 5A.
2. This drama concluded with the Supreme Court's anticlimactic pronouncement, which
simply ratified the outcome already determined through public relations campaigns and federal
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world,3 thereby bringing into sharp relief the condition of the Cuban
nation. As his case mushroomed, that photogenic boy came to personify,
and to embody for the entire world, the image of a nation and
people-indeed, a family--divided by decades of passionate polarities.
That tragic image, unfortunately, does capture a significant portion of
Cuban realities, both on the island and throughout the diaspora. Elian's
fate exemplifies one human tragedy of the Twentieth Century on both
micro- and macro-levels of human experience and existence. But that
image also reifies a grossly simplistic, and increasingly inapt,
understanding of Cuba and Cubans-again, both on the island and
throughout the diaspora.
It is a reification with which I have struggled my entire life-and which
Elian's protracted predicament put squarely in front of me like no other
event had ever before. Born in Cuba to middle-class working parents a few
years before Fidel and his comrades wrested control of the government
from their predecessors, I recall that particular transition ofpower from the
perspective of a child the age of Elian. What I recall most, however, is
how my father and mother argued about it: he in support of the Revolution
as a means of social justice and she warning against an elegant but
deceptive appeal to his and others' utopian longings. After some scary
brushes with the forces of revolution, I found myself on a plane at the age
of five with my cousin (aged six), headed first to Miami and eventually to
an orphanage in Pueblo, Colorado. I recall still the curiosity and anxiety
I felt then about going to a place where, I inferred, everything-people,
trees, cars, houses-would be in red. "Pueblo colorado" means, in
Spanish, literally, red town.
After nearly two years of greenery and snow--only the bricks and the
Garden of the Gods were red-my mother, aunt and sister arrived from
Cuba. My cousin and I were dispatched to them, in Miami, and then we all
lived on a daily basis around the expectation of eventual family reunions
and on the clock of erratically periodic telephonic contacts. Over the next
several years my uncle and my father arrived, creating a gradual sense of
familial reunion and restoration. During all of that time, my mother
showered my sister and me with many expressions of maternal care,

executive decisions. See generally Gonzalez v. Reno, 530 U.S. 1270 (2000); Manny Garcia, Seized
Raid Returns Elian to Father as Angry Protests Dwindle, Strike Called for Tuesday, MIAMI
HERALD, Apr. 23, 2000, at IA.
3. See, e.g., What Next?, ECONOMIST, Apr. 29,2000, at 27. See also Joe Carroll, Cuban Boy
Returns Home as Miami Saga Ends, IRISHTIMES, June 29,2000; Cuba to HonorMigratoryAccords
with US., XINHUA GEN. NEWS SERvIcE, June 29, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, AFP
file; Brian Knowlton, Reno Rejects Florida Ruling on Cuban, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 13, 2000;
Elian ready to head home Wednesday: supporter,AGENCE FR. PREssE, June 28, 2000, available

at LEXIS, News Library, Xinuah file.
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including lectures about the beauty of Cuba and the evil of Fidelismo. As
I grew into adolescence, perhaps in knee-jerk fashion, I rebelled at the
continuing anti-Fidel tirades and critiqued her sentimentalism for preFidelista Cuba as self-serving defensiveness.
Those were heated times for us. But, even as I countered my mom's

lectures, it seemed plain enough that oppressive regimes are contemptible
and, in the long run, untenable enterprises-I could sense this basic point
personally in the unjust realities of everyday life in Miami (and
elsewhere). I sensed, also clearly, that Fidel's regime was among these
forms of enterprise (and, not because of my mother's rants).
Because Fidel, and his allies and acolytes, have not ever been willing
to risk a loss or diminution of their power and status, no matter what,4 I
never have found myself able to accept their extended, indefinite and
totalitarian monopoly on all power, information, and wealth in Cuba. At
the same time, I have been repeatedly disappointed and repelled by the
rigid and unrelenting authoritarianism of Miami's exile politics-an
Orwellian authoritarianism that is perpetrated in the name of political
pluralism and freedom of expression.' Having been raised amidst the
ugliness created between these two poles-my two hometowns-I have
been unable to come to terms with either.
In many ways, therefore, this Essay is about the difficulty of
establishing a grounded identity and social space for children who have
come from Cuba to the United States-like Elian-at a very early age and
in the context of stalemated polarization. These children have been forced
to develop a personal and national identity not only in the midst of a
skeptical and alien culture but also in the face of high-pitched ideological
conflict between the bipolarized world views of Havana's and Miami's
elites, the dueling camps that have instigated and fueled so much hostility
among and between Cubans for so many years. Perhaps not surprisingly,
Elian's case brought this all to the fore for me.6
One day, a guest arriving at my home picked up the dozen or so
newspapers that had piled up by the front door and handed them to me
when I opened the door for him. "Do you want to throw these awayT' he
4. See generally THEODORE DRAPER, CASTRO'S REVOLUTION: MYTHS AND REALITIES
(1962) (discussing the tight hold Fidel Castro and his allies have on Cuba).
5. See generally MARIA DE LOS ANGELOSTORRES, IN THE LAND OF MIRRORS: CUBAN EXILE
POLITICS INTHE UNITED STATES 140-48 (2002).
6. The flight of children has been a continuing story, including the now-fabled "Operation
Pedro Pan" that facilitated the travel of thousands of children from Cuba to Miami. This operation
is the only time in United States history that the federal government has delegated its "plenary
power" over immigration to the sole discretion of private individuals, who were empowered to
grant visas in the name of the United States government. This operation accounts for my travel and
entry to this country. See generally YVONNE M. CONDE, OPERATION PEDRO PAN: THE UNTOLD
EXODUS OF 14,048 CUBAN CHILDREN (1999).
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queried. I took them and set them down in a comer, but I soon afterward
started to concentrate on why I recently, and suddenly, had begun to avoid
reading the newspaper. After a while, I realized that I simply could not
deal with my reactions to Elian's story, as it was in some ways reminiscent
of my own trajectory through life. After some time, as Elian's case
dragged on, I decided that I had to read the stacked-up newspapers, even
if only to be minimally prepared for the daily conversations from which
references to Elian's situation regularly erupt(ed). One day, alone, I went
through them one by one, and then threw them all away. Since then, I have
focused myself more than previously on transcending the inflammatory
rhetoric of "both" sides, as well as the limitations of my intellectual and
personal knowledge, to find ways of identifying as Cuban. Since then, I
have intensified an ongoing, life-long struggle with the facts and forces
that have recreated the leading city of the state in which we meet this
year-as well as the land and people who, in great measure, have
catalyzed that recreation: Cuba and Cubans.7
During the past two years, this effort has taken the form mainly of a
research project in which I have sought to understand, in comparative and
critical terms the worlds offered to us--to me-by the versions of Cuba
and Cubans emanating without relent from Havana and Miami. This
research project, along with my origins and experience, provide the
backdrop for my opinions both of Elian's story and the larger national
tragedy that it represents. This venture is, for me, a personal, political, and
jurisprudential project: as a Queer, Latino law professor in Miami
committed to social justice, I seek to cohere myself in part by composing
a LatCrit and QueerCrit position toward the reconciliation of Cubans and
the reconstruction of Cuba as a postsubordination society. I therefore
approach this Essay, as well as my larger study of Cuba and Cubans, from
a "LatCrit" and a "QueerCrit" perspective s It is from this perspective and
with this motivation that I invite you to join me, and Cubans on both sides

7. See, e.g., SHEILA L. CROUCHER, IMAonINo MIAMI: ETHNIC POLITICS INA POSTMODERN
WORLD (1997); ALEJANDRO PORTES & ALEX STEPICK, CITY ON THE EDGE: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF MIAMI (1993). The Cuban influx and its ramifications have attracted more Latinas/os to Miami

in recent years. See, e.g., Amy Driscoll & Tim Henderson, Many Lands Give FloridaIts Latin
Flavor, MIAMI HERALD, July 25, 2001, at 17A; Andres Viglucci, Census Shows Increase in
Hispanics' Diversity, MIAMI HERALD, May 10, 2001, at IA.
8. Both LatCrit Theory and Queer Legal Theory are evolving discourses and subject

positions that emerged within the legal academy of the United States in the mid-1990s to study the
place and prospects of multiple diverse Latinas/os and sexual minorities, respectively, in
inter/national law and society. Like other strands of outsider jurisprudence, LatCrit Theory and
Queer Legal Theory bring an antisubordinationist stance to the study of legal and social issues. See
generallyFrancisco Valdes, Theorizing "OutCrit" Theories: CoalitionalMethod and Comparative
Jurisprudential Experience-RaceCrits,QueerCrits and LatCrits, 53 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1265
(1999).
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of the Florida Straits, in an effort to transcend the invidious bifurcation
that Havana's and Miami's elites have co-constructed and co-directed
since 1959.
A. Divisionand Corruption:Dueling Elites,
the Battle of the Straits
Since 1959, with the ascension of Fidelismo and the subsequent outflux
of refugees, Cuba and Cubans have been understood mostly through the
unidimensional lens of political ideology in the context of the Cold War.9
But, at the time of their ascension, Fidel and his comrades most likely
possessed, and certainly professed, a vision with integrity of social
transformation. 0 Looking to the bottom of Cuban society, they rightly saw
the condition of Cuba and Cubans as Twentieth Century subalterns, a
people and nation held down by the weight of colonial histories and their
enduring capitalist legacies--the joint bequest of Spanish and North
American imperialism. " While their immediate predecessors in Havana's
corridors of power had cared mostly about simple wealth and might, 2
Fidel and his cohorts focused, at the beginning, on the centrality of
national sovereignty, and on social-economic rights, in the design and
achievement of a post-subordination Cuban society." Though a difference
of opinions continues to prevail on this subject, 4 it probably is a crude
essentialization of Fidel and his original comrades to insist that they were
merely power-hungry and ethically corrupt from the beginning.
At the same time, the early exiles and their families-those who
comprised the "first" wave of post-Fidel Cuban exodus-also were most
likely motivated by a vision-and by fears-that they possessed and
professed with integrity. 5 The early (as well as later) exiles were, from all
appearances, motivated by a genuine belief in political as well as economic

9. For a recent and incisive critical account, see MARIFELI PEREZ-STABLE, THE CUBAN
REVOLUTION: ORIGINS, COURSE, AND LEGACY (2d ed. 1999).
10. See GEOFF SIMONS, CUBA: FROM CONQUISTADOR TO CASTRO 65-164 (1996).

11. Id.
12. Id. at 303-10.
13. For a selection of Fidel's writings, see FIDEL CASTRO, REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE 1947-

1965, at 2-25 (Rolando E. Bonachee &Nelson P. Valdds eds. 1972).
14. In particular, anti-communist Cuban activists insist that Fidel was corrupt and
hypocritical from the beginning of his professedly egalitarian movement. See generally DRAPER,
supra note 4, at 115-72. For various news accounts, see Leslie H. Gelb, The Boiling Point, N.Y.

TIMES, July 24, 1983, § 4, at 1; Rick Kogan, Sorrystory: 'Last Communist'asolidportraitofFidel
Castro,CHI.TRIB., Feb. 11, 1992, at 7C; Charles Krauthammer, The GreatDictator,WASH. POST,
Dec. 14, 1986, at H7; John T. Skelly, The Men Who Left the 26th of July Movement, M~AM
HERALD, July 26, 2001, at 9B.
15. See RICHARD R.FAGEN ET AL., CUBANS INEXILE: DISAFFECTION AND THE REVOLUTION

75-98 (1968).
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agency; they foresaw and feared not only economic centralization but also
political dictatorship. 6 They feared the loss of not only property, but also
liberty-and they were right, for the dictates of political and economic
centralization have meant that everyday people in Fidel's Cuba cannot
aspire to customize and self-direct their individual lives, either in political
or in economic venues. ' Thus, it probably is an equally crude
essentialization of Cuba's exiles to insist that they were merely a petty and
trenchant bourgeoisie from the beginning. Instead, from the beginning,
Cuba and Cubans on both sides of the Florida Straits have been caught
amidst a complex tangle of noble aspirations and well-founded reactions
that nevertheless have devolved since then-both in Havana and in
Miami-into arrogant systems of social control while giving rise to selfrighteous, materially comfortable and mean-spirited elites.
The "Havana elites" encompass primarily the circles of power that
control the two overlapping institutions that authoritatively and forcefully
supervise all life within Cuba: the government and the party, including
perhaps most notably those officials with the power to conduct economic
and political relations with the world external to the island." The "Miami
elites" encompass a loose assemblage ofbusinesspersons-mostly but not
exclusively men-and politicos and politicas (again, mostly men) who
have amassed money or position in this country, and who use their
socioeconomic influence strategically and methodically to promote their
political struggle against the social, economic, and political monopoly of
16. See id. See generally CROUCHER, supra note 7, at 121. Interestingly, in this particular

respect, these exiles mirrored the concerns ofthis country's "founders" in the 1770s and 1780s. See,
e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 18 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed. 2d ed., 1966) (discussing
property and democracy in the construction of the federal constitution and government). In both
instances, then, these groups were concerned both about personal property and political power. This
ideological similarity perhaps accounts at least inpart for the powerful connections forged between
Miami's elites and Washington's elites during these years of diaspor and deadlock.
17. See DRAPER, supra note 4, at 128-33; see also THOMAS M. LEONARD, CASTRO AND THE
CUBAN REVOLUTION 1 .18, 33-66 (1999); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE (CUBA: Country Reports

and Human Rights Practices 2000) (Feb. 2001), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/dr/rls/hrrpt/2000/wha/75 .htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2002). See generally
CUBA'S REPRESSIVE MACHINERY: HUMAN RIoHTs FORTY YEARS AFTER THE REVOLUTION (June
1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/rcportst1999/cuba (last visited Oct. 17, 2002).
18. See PEREZ-STABLE, supra note 9, at 180-83; GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF CUBA: A
COMPREHENSIVE RESOURCE OF CUBA'S GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE, POLITICS, AND ACTORS (July
2001), available at http://www.cubapolidata.com/gpc/gpc-institutionalorder.html; LEONARD,
supra note 17, at 3-50. See generally Papers and Proceedings ofthe Ninth Annual Meeting ofthe
Association for Study of the Cuban Economy, 9 CUBA IN TRANSITION I (1999), available at
http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/ascelcuba9. See also Domingo Amuchastegui, Cuba's Armed
Forces: Power and Reforms, 9 CUBA IN TRANSITION 109 (1999), available at
http://1anic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/asce/cuba9; Armando F. Mastrapa, Ill, Evolution. Transition and
the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces, 9 CUBA IN TRANSITION 115 (1999), available at
http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/asce/cuba9 (1999).
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Havana's elites. 9 Both elites cloak themselves in nationalistic fervor, and
invoke it to mobilize their foot soldiers. But, while both elites speak of
"the people of Cuba," neither is willing to bear the possibility that Cuba
and Cubans might prefer life without them. On the contrary, they
effectively conspire with each other to disenfranchise Cuba and Cubans. 20
As these observations make plain, Havana's and Miami's elites are
very differently structured and positioned. In Havana, the elites depend on
their monopoly over the prerogatives that accompany sovereignty in this
world: they control a state recognized globally as an independent country,
and therefore the apparati of nationhood. Havana's elites have at their
disposal tools that range from a diplomatic corps to armed and espionage
services to the tax and police powers of formal statehood.2 ' In Miami, the
elites depend on their focused influence over the policy of the world's sole
superpower on one particular issue-relations with Cuba;22 though they do
19. See John F. Stack, Jr. & Christopher L. Warren, The Reform Tradition and Ethnic
Politics:MetropolitanMiami Confrontsthe 1990s, MIANINow! 160, 160-85 (Guillermo J.Grenier
&Alex Stepick II. eds., 1992); CROUCHER, supra note 7, at 133; Understandingthe CubanModel:
Cuban-Americansin Miami Politics,CUBAN-AMERICAN POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT (Dr. Wilbur
Rich ed.), availableathttpJ/www.fiu.edu/ -morenod/scholar/empower.htm; see also Karen BranchBrioso et al., PowerShift Seenfor Dade Experts PredictHispanic Gains,MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 4,
2000, at IA. See generallyGuillermo J. Grenier &Max J. Castro, Triadic Politics:Ethnicity,Race,
and Politics in Miami, 1959-1998, 68 HIST. REv. 273 (1999); Dan Sewell, Cubans Have
Transformed Miami Into an Island of OpportunityImmigrants: The Exiles and Their Children
Dominatethe Economy, GovernmentandCulture. The new orderworriessome black leaders,L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 23, 1990, Pt. A, availableat 1990 WL 2290507; Jan Nijman, Globalizationto a Latin

beat: the Miami growth machine, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 164 (1997).
20. See, e.g., TORRES, supra note 5, at 143.
21. See infra note 25 and sources cited therein on political repression in Cuba. While bringing
fiercely to bear the attributes and apparati of sovereignty to club down nonconforming persons who
threaten their dictatorial domination, the Havana elites have reveled in and cultivated the romantic
image of themselves as a heroic David slaying-or at least defying-the menacing Goliath of the
North, especially when the United States has brought to bear the same attributes and apparti of its
sovereignty against them; in both instances, ironically, sovereignty serves oppression. The use of
statehood extends to espionage operations designed to "infiltrate" and destabilize the Miami elites,
which Fidel and his minions label a"mafia" in intentionally pejorative ways. See, e.g., Ellis Berger,
INS Official Convicted in Spy Case: Federal Jury Rules Exile Passed Secrets to Cuba, SUNSENTINEL, May 31, 2000, at IA.; Alfonso Chardy & Elaine De Valle, The New Cuba Crisis:
Havana Has Spied on Exiles for Years, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 28, 1996, at 13A; David Kidwell,
Three More A ccusedSpiesAgree to Plead Guilty, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 9, 1998, at4B; Associated
Press, 5 Cubans Convictedin Plot to Spy on US., N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2001, at A12; Gail Epstein
Nieves &Alfonso Chardy, CubanSpies Convicted: Sweeping Espionage Verdicts Include Murder
of Fliers: Exiles Call Castro'sIndictment in Air Deaths, MIAMI HERALD, June 9, 2001, at IA;
Situationof Human Rights in Cuba,Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 16, U.N. ESCOR, 57th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2001/16 (2001).
22. The "embargo" and its recent intensification via the Helms-Burton Act is one apt example
of this influence. See, e.g., Maya Bell, Powerful Foundation Focuses Fight to Free Cuba,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 25, 1994, at Al, available at 1994 WL 4722917. See also Robert E.
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not "own" a country outright, as do the Havana elites, Miami's elites have
shown a singular capacity (at least until the Elian affair) to manipulate
American policy toward all things Cuban (and, in turn, to be manipulated
by American policymakers23). Thus, in limited but crucial instances
Miami's elites indirectly can activate the attributes and apparati of
American sovereignty to destabilize the Havana elites and to assert their
own interests.24 Without doubt, then, both sets of elites ground their power
in formidable structures and leverage them shrewdly. They are caught in
a mutual death grip because both have enough might to survive and
struggle endlessly, but neither has enough to triumph definitively. Though
positioned very differently in their sources and instruments of power, the
two elites have co-constructed a world of tensions suspended indefinitely
between their bipolar entrenchment. 25 Despite the internal complexities

Freer, Jr., Helms-Burton Myths andReality, 5 CUBA INTRANSITION 429 (1995), availableathttp://
lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/asce/cuba5; Digna B. French, Economic Sanctions Imposed by the
United States Against Cuba: Thirty-Nine Year Old Embargo Culminating with the Cuban Liberty
and DemocraticSolidarity (Libertad)Act of 1996, 7 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (19981999); Andreas F. Lowenfield, Agora: The Cuban Liberty and DemocraticSolidarity(Libertad)
Act Congress andCuba: The Helms-BurtonAct, 90 AM. J.OF INT'L L. 419 (1996); Robert L. Muse,
InternationalSymposium on the CubanLiberty and DemocraticSolidarity (Libertad)Act of 1966:
A Public InternationalLaw Critique of the ExtraterritorialJurisdictionof the Helms-Burton Act
(Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1966), 30 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 207 (1996-1997); Mercy B. Pina, Comment: Despite the Controversy Surrounding the
Helms-Burton Act Its End is FarFrom Becoming a Reality, 4 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1259
(1998); Alejandro Portes, Morning in Miami; A New Erafor Cuban-American Politics, AM.
PROSPECT, May-June 1998, at 28. This race-sex hierarchy of course reflects-and
perpetuates-historic hierarchies established by European colonization. See generallyBETWEEN
RACE AND EPImE: AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND CUBANS BEFORE THE CUBAN REVOLUTION (Lisa
Brock & Digna Castaneda Fuertes eds., 1998), avaiable at http://www.netlibrary.com/
ebookinfo.asp?product id=51296.
23. The Bay of Pigs fiasco and missile crisis are ready examples of this mutual manipulation.
See HUGH THOMAS, CUBA, OR THE PURSUIT OF FREEDOM 1355-1419 (1998 ed.).
24. The Elian affair is a prime example of a failed effort. See Juan 0. Tamayo, Saga of Elian;
Raidand Reunion, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 25,2000, at9A. The Helms-Burton Act is a prime example
of a successful effort. See also supra note 22.
25. While both elites operate cohesively, as past and present experience-including the Elian
affair-amply confirm, they are not necessarily monolithic congregations of groups, persons, and
institutions. Havana's and Miami's elites do not always operate smoothly, or have all their foot
soldiers marching neatly in unison to the beat of the master drummers. In Havana, reports surface
periodically of political purges that reflect internal fissures. See, e.g., Rey Moseley, Drug
CrackdownSpurs CubaPurge,CHI. TRIB., June 30, 1989, at 4M; Juan 0. Tamayo, Cuba Toughens
Crackdown: 'Biggest Wave of Repression So Far This Year,'MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 1I, 1999, at
IA; Juan 0. Tamayo, Havana Tries to Stem Wave of BoatEscapes, MIAMI HERALD, July 22, 1999,
at IA; Cuban DissidentsComplete Human Rights Fast,MIAMI HERALD, July 17, 1999, at IA. See
also infra note 35 regarding political repression in Cuba. In Miami, in the meantime, intergenerational transitions are causing similar splits within the Cuban American National Foundation
(CANF), which oftentimes is described as the crucible for Miami's Cuban elites. See, e.g., Rafael
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and comparative differences, on both sides of the Straits, these dual elites
exist and operate as interconnected groups, persons, and institutions
actuated by a common formal platform ofpolitical ideology. On both sides
of the Straits, the adherents of these sometimes unruly factions can be, and
are, disciplined forcefully in various ways by their respective commanders
and comrades for straying too far from approved dictates.
These elites, however, do not represent-they do not even try to-the
multiple diverse communities that they profess to care so much about.
Indeed, both Havana and Miami house elites that represent the worst of
colonialism's contemporary legacies. Both sustain racist, sexist, and
homophobic premises and structures of subordination.
In Cuba, for instance, positions of power both in the government and
in the party overwhelmingly still are held, controlled, and dispensed by
openly straight white men.2" Ditto in Miami's Cuban enclave' 7-- as

Lorente & TamaraLyte, TradeDemands,Loss ofLeaderSap CloutofAnti-Castro Cubansin US.,
CHI. TRIB., June 21, 2000, at 8; Christopher Marquis, Cuban-AmericanLobby on the Defensive,
N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2000, at A12; Luisa Yanez, CANF Board PondersFutureAmid Public Rift,

MIAMI HERALD, July 22, 2001, at 3B. See also Cynthia Corzo et al., Foundationriven by dissent
among Miami Cubans, MIAMI HERALD, July 21,200 , at IA; Elaine De Valle & Carol Rosenberg,
Fx-CANF Member Explains Resignation, MIAMI HERALD, July 24, 2001, at IB; Elaine De Valle

& Carol Rosenberg, CANF Ignites Cuban Media, MIAMI HERALD, July 25, 2001, at 3A; Fabiola
Santiago, CANF leaderclaims his latefather's legacy but says he doesn't walk in his shadow,
MIAMI HERALD, July 29, 2001, at IA.; Robert L. Steinback, CANF Rift May Open New Doors,
MIAMI HERALD, July 29, 2001, at lB. Nevertheless, and in spite of their various differences, both

bipolar elites have shown themselves over time to be cohesive forces and formations, even if only
by their increasing interest in self-perpetuation and self-aggrandizement above all--certainly above
the protection or advancement of the principles they loudly tout(ed).
26. See generally LOIS M. SMITH & ALFRED PADULA, SEX AND REVOLUTION: WOMEN IN
SOCIALIST CUBA 45-187 (1996); Julie Marie Bunck, Women andthe Post-ColdWarSocialism: The
Cases of Cuba and Vietnam, 7 CUBA IN TRANSITION 21, 26-27 (1997), at

http://Ilanic.ulexcs.edu//a/Cuba/ascelCuba7/bunck.pdf; Debra Evenson, Women'sEqualityinCuba:
What Difference Does a Revolution Make?, 4 LAW & INEQ. 295 (1986). See also STATISTICAL

RECORDOF WOMEN WORLDWIDE605-606(Linda Schmittroth ed., 1991);Nadine T. Fernandez, The
Color of Love: Young InterracialCouples in Cuba, 23 LATIN AM. PERSP. 99 (1996); Alejandro de
la Fuente, Race, National Discourse, and Politics in Cuba, 25 LATIN AM. PERSP. 43 (1998);
Alejandro de la Fuente, The Resurgenceof Racism in Cuba. 34 NACLA REP. ON AM. 29 (2001);
Tanya Kateri Hernandez, Multiracial Matrix: The Role of Ideology in Enforcement of
AntidiscriminationLaws, A UnitedStates-LatinAmerica Comparison,87 CORNELL L. REv. 1093,

1133-44 (2002) (analyzing race and White supremacy in Cuba); Sheryl L. Lutjens, Reading
Between the Lines: Women the States, andRectificationin Cuba,22 LATIN AM. PERSP. 100, (1995);
NationalAssembly of the People's Power, Government and Politics of Cuba:A Comprehensive
Resource of Cuba's Government Structure, Politics, and Actors (July 2001), available at

http://www.cubapolidata. com/gpc/gpcinstitutionalorder.html (last visited OcL 18,2002). As with
male and White supremacy on the island, today's Cuba similarly retains its historic hetrosexism.
See, e.g., IAN LUMSDEN, MACHOS, MARICONES AND GAYS: CUBA AND HOMOSEXUALITY (1996).
27. See generallyU.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P23-205,
PopulationProfileof the UnitedStates:America at the Close ofthe 20& Century(U.S. Government
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throughout the United States, more generally.28 And, both camps are elitist
and classist-though they differ on their choice of political or ideological
pivots for the erection of their elites, classes, and hierarchies. Thus,
Havana's elites favor the straight white men who espouse their pet slogans
while Miami's elites do likewise; and, in both instances, these are the
persons who tend to reside in the nicest homes and neighborhoods of their
respective domains. In both instances, these post/neo/colonial elites use
Law to buttress their control of Society, and embed personal predilection
in Law to safeguard their arrogated privileges and reproduce the structural
predominance of their kind in Law and throughout Society. While
apologists on both sides of the Florida Straits are quick to issue
impassioned defenses of the ultimate intentions that justify present
shortcomings, the fact remains that in nearly a half century neither
Havana's nor Miami's elites have shown much interest in social
transformation when it might disturb their preferred positions at the apex
of their respective heaps.
Euroheteropatriarchy still governs hegemonically in the worlds and
agendas constructed both by Havana's and Miami's elites:29 both sides of

Printing Office, 2002); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU; POPULATION PROJECTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1995 TO 2050, available at
AGE,
SEX,
AND
HISPANIC ORIGIN:
http://www.census.gov/prod/www/titles.htnl#popest; THECUBAN AMERICAN NATIONAL COUNCIL,
A DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF CUBAN AMERICANS (1994) [hereinafter DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF
CUBAN AMERICANS]; Anthony DePalma, For Haitians, Voyage to a Land of Inequality, N.Y.
TIMES, July 16, 1991, atAl ; LydiaMartin, Lifting the Burden ofMachismo More Women Speaking
Out Against Hispanic Tradition of Patriarchy, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 13, 1994, at 11; Government
& Elections,HISPANIC AMERICANS: A STATISTICAL SOURCEBOGK, 108-09 (2001); MireyaNavarro,
Black and Cuban-American: Bias in 2 Worlds,N.Y.TIMES, Sept. 13,1997, at A3; MirtaOjito, How
Race is Lived in America, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2000, at AI; Schmittroth, supra note 26, at 600 &
612. See also Karen Branch-Brioso et al., The Real Power in Dade Despite Hispanic Majority,
White Non-Hispanics Hold Sway Control of Key Public, Private Positions Contradicts Image,
Herald Survey Finds, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 3, 2000, at IA.
28. See generally BUREAU OF CENSUS, 1992 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, I GOVERNMENT
ORGANiZATON, NUM. 2, POPULARLY ELECTED OFFICIALS 20-21 (1995).
29. Euroheteropatriarchy describes a Eurocentric fusion ofandrosexist and heterosexist biases
and prejudices producing overtime the systematic privileging of humans, groups, norms and values
that are identified, among other things, as white, masculine and heterosexual. See Francisco Valdes,
Symposium. Intersections: Sexuality, Cultural Tradition, and the Law: Unpacking HeteroPatriarchy: Tracing the Conflation on Sex, Gender and Sexual Orientation to Its Origins, 8 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 161 (1996) (describing some of the sex/gender and sexual orientation norms that
underlie and animate androsexism and heterosexism to produce the patriarchal form of
homophobia-heteropatriarchy--that still prevails in Euroamerican societies, including the United
States, today). As elaborated here, it is prevalent in Cuba and among Cubans, both on the island and
throughout the Diaspora. It is rooted in the normativities introduced and imposed by Iberian and
other European conquistadors. It is supported by the cultural and political preferences of American
imperialism throughout this hemisphere during the past century or two. Today, both sets of elites
reproduce Euroheteropatriarchy in the act of re/producing themselves and their hierarchies;
BY
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the Florida Straits remain anchored to a preference for openly straight
white men as the leaders and principal beneficiaries of their inter/national
projects. White supremacy, male supremacy, and straight supremacy reign
still over Cubans, whether in Havana or Miami.30
These dueling elites thus represent little more than sanitized competing
political ideals to which they once might have aspired authentically, but
to which they no longer bow. Both sides of the Straits now connive to foist
on Cuba and Cubans the worn, sugarcoated slogans that serve mainly to
maintain their personal positions and mutually self-interested politics. This
devolution today shows that Havana's elites would rather sell the country
to opportunistic and ravenous neocolonial capitalists from Canada and
Europe-most noticeably, and some would say ironically, the old colonial
master, Spain---and to accommodate the growing prostitution and sex
tourism on the island generated from the "decadent" societies with which
Havana elites choose to conduct "business," than to accept even a
modicum of political or economic decentralization. 3' For their part,
Miami's elites would rather destroy the country's infrastructure and,
apparently, starve every single person on the island than take even a first
tiny step toward negotiated resolution to the embargo they erected with a

regardless of the emphasized differences in political ideology, the same social profile comes out
"on top" while the same marginalized identities are pushed to "the bottom"---both in Havana and
in Miami.
30. Of course, Fidelismo has enabled the betterment of living conditions for some segments
of the population: some women and nonwhites have risen in the ranks of Cuba's hierarchies while
the oppression of sexual minorities waxes and wanes according to the pulse of Havana's elites. See
generally ALEJANDRODELA FUENTE, RECREATING RACISM: RACE AND DISCRIMINATION IN CUBA'S

"SPECIAL PERIOD" (1998); FAGEN, supra note 15, at 39-47 and 121-42; Phillip Geyelin, Fidel's
Cuba: CastroHangs Onto His Big Following Despite Rising Economic Woes, WALL ST. J., Aug.
14, 1964, at 1; James C. McKinley, In City of Castro'sTriumph, Most Still Back Him, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 2, 1999, at A3. See also supra note 26 and sources cited therein on race, sex, and sexual
orientation in Fidel's Cuba. The same is true in the United States generally. See U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, MONEY INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES: 1999 (U.S.

Government Printing Office), P60-209 pg. xi, available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/
www/income99.html; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL INCOME TABLES: CURRENT POPULATION

SURVEY (2002), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/histinctb.html.; and
specifically among the exile enclave in Miami. See, e.g., PORTES & STEPICK, supra note 7, at 12349. See also DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF CUBAN AMERICANS, supra note 27. Both over there and
over here, some social and legal conditions indeed have been made "better" in material terms for
some Cubans, including some identified with traditionally oppressed outgroups. Yet the privilege
and dominance of straight white men remains structurally entrenched.
31. See, e.g., Julia O'Connell Davidson, Sex tourism in Cuba, 38 RACE & CLASS: J. FOR
BLACK&THIRD WORLD LIBERATION 39-49 (1996); Paul Cullen, Tourism CorrodesSoul of Cuban
Revolution, IRISHTIMES, Jan. 8,2001, at 14 (World News); Isabel Garcia-Zarza, RestrictedAccess,
available at http://abc.go.com/sections/travel.DailyNews/cubatourism000302.htm (last visited
Aug. 8, 2001); Ron Howell, In Cuba, Old Racial Attitudes Revived; Critics Say Tourism Has
Brought Bias Back, NEWSDAY, May 13, 2001, at A04;.
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complicitous United States. 32 Both sets of elites, in short, remain uniformly
committed first and foremost to their own reproduction in both ideological
and demographic terms.
Each camp has failed in ultimate and substantive terms, for neither has
cared enough about its proclaimed communities and original principles,
and both have cared too much about the pursuit and perpetuation of their
supremacy; both have opted for personal gain over principled nationbuilding. On the island, Fidel certainly has not honored his early words
and promises of egalitarian reformation with actions and policies designed
consistently to fulfill them. 33 His regime has, instead, cultivated a cultist
centralization of power in his person; while Fidel does not (and humanly
cannot) control every act or abuse that takes place in his revolution's
name, he wields virtually absolute influence over any particular decision
of policy or practice in his government, and he has shown himself ready,
willing, and able to order unilaterally, and at will, acts of violence or
intimidation directed against the Cuban people. 34 Today, his government
increasingly misuses and abuses national sovereignty and its attributes to
oppress, rather than to empower or liberate, Cuba and Cubans.35
Fidelismo's early promise consequently does not match its actual
record-even before the embargo and even in matters that cannot, by any
stretch of the imagination, be imputed by rote to "the embargo." In the
enclave, Miami's elites on the whole have shown a stalwart interest in
"freedom of expression" and "democracy"-but only when they liked
what they saw and heard. 36 And when not, exile elites have whipped up

32. See, e.g., Peter G. Bourne, The Impact of the US. Embargo on Health and Nutrition in
Cuba, 8 CUBA IN TRANSITION 213 (1998), available at http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/
asce/cubag; Maria C. Werlau, The Effects of the US. Embargo on Health and Nutrition in Cuba:
A Critical Analysis, 8 CUBA IN TRANSITION 219 (1998), available at
http://lanic.utexas.edu/a/cb/cuba/ asce/cubag; Guy Gugliotta, Hard-Liners Dig in on the Issue of
Embargo; Cuban American Foundation Is Determined Not to Founder After Loss ofIts Leader,

WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 1998, at A16; Juan 0. Tamayo, Ex-US. Official to LeadPro-Embargo Drive,
MIAMI HERALD, June 30, 2000, at IA. See generally UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE
COMMISSION, Ti ECONOMIC IMPACT OF U.S. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CUBA, Investigation

No. 332.413 (2001), available at ftp://ftp.usite.gov/reports/studies/pub3398.pdf. But cf Ken
Guggenheim, Embargo's Impact Slight, Report Says Cuba's Trade Seen as Limited by Own
Politics, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 16, 2001, at IA.

33. See generally LEONARD, supra note 17, at 85.
34. See generally id.
35. See, e.g., Castro Abuses Crime Crackdown to Muzzle Political Dissidents, FORT

LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Feb. 23, 1999, at 22A; Howard W. French, Castro Meets Dissent
With an Iron Hand, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1991, at 3; Colin McMahon, Castro's Crackdown, CHI.
TRIB., Mar. 1, 1996, at IN. See also supra notes 17, 18 and 25 and sources cited therein on Fidel's
political dictatorship.

36. For example, one of Miami's most established and prominent restaurants in Little
Havana--Centro Vasco-was bombed and driven out of business when it dared to allow a Cuban
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outrageous reactions, including acts of violence and intimidation, from
misinformed and excitable constituencies." In sum, the dominant elites on
both sides of the Straits have resorted to vicious disinformation, social
suppression and physical violence for the sake of power, preferring to
"win" their petty but destructive battles at any cost-especially when
"winning" has become tantamount to personal power and privilege. In
their reciprocal craving for status, comfort and triumph, both have
deformed or eclipsed their original sense of ethics and have rendered
themselves into caricatures of their early, and perhaps once authentic,
impulses.
Nonetheless, or perhaps consequently, since 1959 Cubans both on the
island and throughout the diaspora increasingly have been situated by
themselves and others as "for" and "against" the two different and
powerful political camps that emerged contemporaneously in Havana and
Miami from the ascension of Fidelismo and the outflux of refugees.3" In
Havana, time has enabled a bold, if corrupt, experiment that still defies the
homogenizing pressures of rapacious capitalism and, most recently,
neoliberal embrace of corporatist globalization; despite its fundamental
flaws, this soiled experiment provides some hope that a concrete
alternative to this newest, transnational hegemony-in-the-making may yet
become vital. 9 From Miami, time has permitted the formation and
singer from the island to perform on its premises. See Armando Correa, Restaurant Cancels Cuban
Singer's PerformancesCentro Vasco HadBeenFirebombed,MIAMI HERALD, July 13, 1996, at IB;
Frances Robles, A Landmark's End: Centro Vasco Falls Prey to Exile Politics,MIAMI HERALD,
Oct. 27, 1996, at lB. This example is neither unique nor rare. See Heatingup Cuba:Anti-Castro
Exiles Plot New Raids, Aim to Win Stronger US. Support, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 1962, at 1; All
Things Considered, Analysis: Cuban-AmericanRadio Stations Influence the Cuban Community
(Nat'l Pub. Radio Broadcast), Apr. 18, 2000,2000 WL 21468835; David Adams, BombsDo Not
Destroy Miami'sNew Tolerance,ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 5, 1996, at IB; Pamela Constable,
New Voices ofExile Although the Cuban-AmericanPoliticalEstablishmentRemains Conservative,
Democrats and Socialistic Iconoclasts Are Gaining Ground "For The First Time in This
Community, "Says One Party Leader, "There Is A LegitimateDebate Going On, " BOSTON GLOBE,
July 25, 1993, at 10; Shelley Emling, Miami Politics Bar Cuban Musicians From Festival,
ATLANTA J. & CoNST., Aug. 31, 1997, at 8A; Lydia Martin, Violence, Dialogue In a Year of
Tumult, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 29, 1996, at I.
37. See, e.g., Liz Balzameda, Emilio Milldn, Broadcaster Who Denounced Terror, Dies,
MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 16, 2001, at IA; Liz Balsameda, Milidn a Symbol of Courage, MIAMI
HERALD, Mar. 19,2001, at I B; Castro Foe Injured in Miami CarBlast,N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1976,
at 42. See also Cuban Hit Squad: Anti-Castro 'Omega 7' Evokes Terror in US. With Murders,
Bombs. WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1981, at I; ALPHA 66, availableat http://www.alpha66.org/; Luisa
Yanez, Hundreds Mourn 'Man of Honor, 'MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 18, 2001, at 4B.
38. See generally TORRES, supra note 5.
39. This possibility attracts support for Fidel despite his political totalitarianism. See, e.g.,
Richard Boudreaux, MandelaLauds Castroas Visit to CubaEnds; Diplomacy:ANC LeaderCites
the Communist Revolution andSays "We, too, want to control our own destiny,"L.A. TIMES, July

28, 1991, at A4; Castro'sAnti-US. Message Is Welcomed By a Malaysian Leader Critical of
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flourishment of an "exile" community that, despite its regular fits of
intolerance and vitriol, still vaunts within Cuban inter/national discourse
and politics the importance to human wellbeing of individual agency and
freedom of expression in economic and political matters; this rancorous
experiment has prevented a quiet consolidation of both tyranny and social
justice within the island's confines.4 ° During this time, as the Elian case
has illustrated, both camps have done a superlative job in propagating and
legitimating their world views. Both sets of elites have constructed
discourses, regimes, and communities that give political, intellectual, and
material spectacle to the hierarchies that they signify and valorize. Both
sets of elites, in tandem, have enabled each other's clamp on their
respective levers of power and privilege, as opposing cosmologies that
coexist primarily, if not exclusively, as a result of the high-tension
stalemate that they have managed to cocreate before a rapt and dazed
world.
Increasingly, then, it has become clear that Havana and Miami
represent, for Cuba and Cubans, a choice between a rock and a hard place.
Havana, like a rock, has insisted that its bold experiment can exist only if
"the people" agree to forfeit political agency on both individual and
national levels-and in effective perpetuity. 4' Miami, like a hard place, has
insisted that human agency and freedom of expression can exist only if
"the people" accept the unjust precepts and vagaries oframpant capitalism,
including social inequality and extreme poverty-also in effective
perpetuity.42 With increasing absolutism, inspired in part by the demands
and dynamics of bipolarization, these two capitals of Cuba and Cubans
have preached and practiced ideologies that construct politically
"different" yet strikingly similar hierarchies of privilege and
power-arrangements that structurally and substantively benefit the
neocolonial few at the expense of the multiply diverse many. Despite their
tangible successes as measured in narrow and selfish terms, time is not on
their side.

Globalization, Cuban Salutes His Hosts as Fellow Rebels, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, May 13,
2001, at A5;At Castro's Invitation, Aristide Visits Havana, MIAMI HERALD, July 18,2001, at 14A;

Castro Uses Forum ofPoor Nations to Attack Capitalism, CHI. TIUB., Apr. 13,2000, atN23; Roger
Simon, Mandela Commends Clinton, Defends Ties to Libya, Cuba, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 28, 1998, at
N3; Richard Sine, Castro Looms Over Meeting: Cuba Questions FillAirAs ID8 Members Debate,
NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 29, 2000, at C01.

40. See generally TORRES, supra note 5 (recounting and analyzing the waves of Cuban
immigration since Castro's victory over Batista's dictatorship, and the sociopolitical implications
of these migrations).
41. See generally DRAPER, supra note 4,at 42-48.
42. See generally TORRES, supra note 5, at 155-200.
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B. Arrogationand Class Distinctions:The Politics of
Tyranny and Money
One of Fidel's principal methods of imposing "justice" and
disempowering his "enemies" upon seizing power in 1959 was ruthlessly
to concentrate control over all property in himself and his cronies.43 This
sweeping dispossession of the Cuban people was not a nuanced or orderly
project. And it extended not just to grand plantations, or even street-corner
pharmacies, but to everything of every kind, including personal
possessions. Though Fidel's rules on property ownership and use have
shifted with the winds of need and strategy," his centralized control over
the disposition and reallocation of all forms of property, and of their
commercial or personal uses, has been the crucible for the construction of
"rich" and "poor"-those who eat well and those who do not, those who
travel and those who do not, those who live comfortably and those who do
not. Thus, in Cuba, Havana's elites control the party that controls the state

43. See generally STEVEN E. HENDRIX, TENSIONS INCUBAN PROPERTY LAW, 29 (1996);
Nicolas J.Gutierrez, Jr., Esq., The De-Constitutionalization ofPropertyRights: Castro'sSystematic
Assault on Private Ownership in Cuba, 5 Y.B. OF INT'L L. 51 (1996/1997); Jose A. Ortiz, The
Illegal Expropriationof Propertyin Cuba: A Historicaland Legal Analysis of the Takings and a
Survey ofRestitution Schemesfor a Post-SocialistCuba,22 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 321
(2000); Eduardo Moises Penalver, RedistributingProperty:NaturalLaw, InternationalNorms, and
the PropertyReforms ofthe Cuban Revolution, 52 FLA. L. REv. 107 (2000). See also infranote 44
on Fidel's property take-overs.
44. See generally LEONARD, supra note 17, at 85. The reports of the news media over the
years reflect these policy shifts. See, e.g., Joie Chen & Lucia Newman, BadBusiness: CubaCracks
Down on PrivateEnterprise,(CNN Television Broadcast, Mar. 9,2001), availableatLEXIS, News
library, CNN file; A Crash Course in Economics: The Belated Discovery of Profit and Loss,
ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 1996, at 5; Robert D. Cruz& J.Antonio Villamil, Sustainablesmall enterprise
development in a Cuban transitioneconomy, 34 STUD.COMP. INT'L DEV. 100 (2000); Business
Group Wants PrivateSectorin Cuba,ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 2, 1999, at A 18; Cuba'sEconomy:
Mala Vista Social Club, ECONOMIST, Oct. 23, 1999, at 37; Openfor Business? Cuba's Economy,
ECONOMIST, Dec. 4, 1993, at 71; Cuba's Economic Repression, Mar. 16, 2001, available at
http://www.ibb.gov/editorialsf09186.htm; Cuba Promotes Oil Business in Exclusive Economic
Zone, BBC WORLDWIDE MONiTORINo, (BBC Television Broadcast, Aug. 11, 1999), available at
LEXIS, News library, BBCMIR file; Laurie Goering, The HasardsofEnterprise,ECONOMIST, Apr.
6, 1996, at 7; Laurie Goering, Cuba's Small CapitalistsFace Less FriendlyFuture: They Helped
the Nation Weather an Economic Low, But the Government is Making Things Much Tougher Now,
CHI. TRIB., Jun. 20, 2001, at NI, availableat CuBANEWS, http://www.cubanet.org/Cnews/yO]/
junO !/20e9.htm; Hispanics-Cuba/Spain(1st Lead)SpaniardsandCubansPledge More Business,
EFE NEWS SERVICE, July 7, 2001, availableat LEXIS, World library, 6NW file; Lucia Newman,
Cuba squeezesprivate business as economy grows, CNN, Mar. 11, 2001, availableat CUBANEWS
http://www.cuabmet.org/ Cnews0l/mar0l/!2e6.htm; Marta Beatrice Roque, A Cuban Economist
Callsfor Less Official Meddling, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 2000, at A 17; CubaSlows Free Market
Changes, May 1, 1996, availableat http://www.sn.apc.org/wmail/issues/ 960501/BUS I7.html.
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that controls all property."5 In this way, the governing cliques retain
effective control over the attributes of "ownership" of all property and its
uses via their strict control of the party and government-due to their prior
deployment of "the state" to "nationalize" property, thereby arrogating
personal control (and, if desired, personal possession) of any given asset.
In this manner, Havana's elites arrogate and dispense the best of
everything to themselves, their courtiers, and their foot soldiers.
In key and ironic ways, the Fidelista construction ofpersonal economic
security or wellbeing is very similar to Cuba's colonial structuring, in
which personal material comforts, or socioeconomic status, are linked to
the personal favors of the king or jefe--or of his designated
agents-based, typically, on demonstrated levels of political servitude and
utility.' This construction is similar, in fact, to the days immediately
preceding Fidel's revolution, when another corrupt dictatorship controlled
the state and the people-and their personal properties or fortunes-with
brute force.47 In today's Cuba, as in yesterday's, access to economic
advancement remains structurally correlated to manifest political
allegiance to the Havana elites' self-serving agendas. Today as before, the
loyalists live well-and it is no coincidence that Cuba's ruling class
continues to consist mostly of White men; the rest, for the most part, do
not. 8 In this ongoing scheme, both possession and dispossession are

45. See generally supra note 44 and sources cited therein on Cuba's changing policy on
property, trade, and private enterprise.
46. See SIMONS, supranote 10, at 102-13 (discussing colonial arrangements).
47. The followers of Fidel's predecessor, Fulgencio Batista, continue to live in the United
States and abroad. See Michael Bowning, The Cuban Revolution, 40 Years Later: For Batista 's
Dwindling Band, Each New Year Dawns Somberly, PALM BEACH POST, Jan. 1, 1999, at IA.
48. See generally supra note 26 cited therein on the identity politics of Cuban society and
government. The material dimensions of these power/status disparities have been exacerbated by
the "dollarization" of the Cuban economy--an ironic act for a socialist state, and one that has
spawned a "dual economy" on the island, vividly illustrating both how far Havana's elites have
compromised their original principles as well as that they effectively have abandoned their formal
revolutionary aspirations. See generally CARMELA MESA-LAGO, ARE ECONOMIC REFORMS
PROPELLING CUBA TO THE MARKET? 24-30 (1994). In this dual economy, the Havana elites' control
over jobs-and over coveted access to the dollar-freely use their control over such access to
practice politics, and to shore up their elite status and power, as illustrated in the political
maneuvering over the "Varela Project." One woman, for example, expressed the fear of job loss
if she did not publicly subscribe to the party line on questions of political reforms, saying "Don't
you realize? I work in a dollar store." Another was quoted as saying that, "You know what is
expected of you ... so you go and get it over with." See Anita Snow, Associated Press, Cubans
Want to Know Text of Varela Project, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 24, 2002, at Al1l. At a recent
academic conference on Cuba's economy, Cuba scholars widely reported the existence of a highly
centralized economic order controlled directly by the party elites through the structures and apparati
of government-a centralization ofcontrol that ensures control over the nation's (non)productivity,
wealth and potential in part by adopting capitalist techniques in highly strategic ways. See Time
Johnson, Castro has Chokehold on Private Sector, Scholars Say, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 21, 2002,
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decided from above-centrally and potentially immediately-in economic,
social, and political terms.
Also in keeping with colonial times, this political monopoly over the
"good things in life"--ranging from private residences to international
travel, and from shoes to vegetables-is the scheme through which not
only class hierarchies are constructed in today's Cuba but also through
which political allegiance is induced strategically. This monopoly both
entrenches the Havana elites' political power and determines class position
for everyone on the island. This unchecked power over material conditions
and comforts, now as then, has served mightily to help Havana's elites
entrench political control over the people and economy of the island.
Today, under Fidelismo's tightly centralized systems of control, persons
deemed ideologically unreliable simply have no chance of personal
security, much less success, either in social or economic terms.4 9 The
Havana elites' complete control and shrewd manipulation of their unjust
monopoly, which gives them the power to determine socioeconomic status
for every single individual on the island, is a mighty source of tyranny
because it manipulates and exploits human needs and wants.
Fidelismo, of course, has not erased the need to acquire food, shelter,
and other material necessities and luxuries of corporeal human existence.
But, despite its longstanding monopoly on power, Fidelismo has not erased
stratification based on distinctions in access to, enjoyment of, and control
over socioeconomic goods and opportunities. Class construction thus
occurs in Cuba, albeit differently than in Miami or other capitalist
contexts. Fidelismo, in other words, has not erased the existence of "class"
in Cuba or material inequalities among "classes" of Cubans. Under
Fidelismo, where "the state" holds dominion over all property, and where
"the state" in fact amounts to a small self-anointed clique of straight white
men that rule by the force of the gun, the social and economic fortunes of
multiply diverse individuals are decided by those men in reference to their
own perceived self interests, and at the expense of all others, including
society as a whole. Fidelismo, then, simply has reconfigured the politics
of class construction between and among Cubans in Cuba.
In Miami, as one might expect, class is constructed in the typical
capitalist ways of these times, as practiced generally in the United States

at 9A. See also supra note 18 and sources cited therein on power structures, relations, and dynamics
on the island. The bottom line generated through these intersections of identity, ideology, class, and
status is that the formally supreme political body on the island, the party Politburo, remains a
bastion of White men-none of them openly gay. See PABLO ALONSO, Los ULTIMOS CASTRiSTAS
(1998) (describing the individual members of this ruling group).

49. See generally Andres Oppenheimer, Free Four Dissidents, Europe Tells Cuba, MIAMI
HERALD, Mar. 18, 1999, at IA; Cuba Law Cracking Down on Dissidents Passed,MIAMI HERALD,
Feb. 17, 1999, at 10A. See also supra notes 25 and 35 on Fidel's political monopoly.
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and, increasingly, globally: human exploitation for short-term profit
maximization and personal material enrichment. But the Miami elites also
have carved out their well-publicized socioeconomic "enclave" in Miami,
an ethnic universe that in many ways parallels the local traditional Anglo
establishment and that serves as a springboard both to economic
enrichment and inter/national political influence.5" In this enclave's highly
politicized environment, politics, ideology, and class also intersect
relentlessly; although the overarching (dis)incentive structure is organized
around contemporary capitalism, and although Miami elites do not enjoy
the centralized and nearly absolute political power of their 'Havana
counterparts, access to opportunity and comfort in Miami, and especially
in the enclave, oftentimes is linked to politics and ideology-more
specifically, political allegiance to, and ideological conformance with, the
Miami elites and their interests. It is no coincidence that the rich and
famous produced by the enclave are time and again elite-identified in both
ideological and demographic terms;"' in this circular process, allegiance
begets recognition and reward, while opposition attracts the ostracism and
oppression-removal from the corridors of opportunity, status, and
influence.
Thus, both in Miami and in Havana, the elites use ideology to design
and engineer class construction. Both here and there, the elites strive to
control individuals' access to personal advancement and enrichment in a
manner designed principally to shore up their own political agendas and
personal status. Both are unjust because both elevate in structural terms the
personal gain of a powerful few at the expense of social equity and
progress for the many.
C. Global Circus, Domestic Division: Cubans as
Sport and Spectacle
While Havana's and Miami's elites are the principal antagonists in this
tragedy, the colossus to the North-the United States, its government and
its public-represents an omnipresent set of factors that exert a powerful
force on the dynamics of Cubans' bifurcated state. "Yanquis" are both the
audience and actor in myriad and interlacing ways. The government of the
United States, like the Havana and Miami elites, is integral to this
stalemated status quo; Cuba remains a uniquely sore point for the United
50. See supra note 7 on Miami's "Latinization."
51. The Cuban power structure in Miami tends to be white, male, capitalist, and conservative.
See generally LEONARD, supra note 17, at 67-78 (describing the "angry exiles" of Miami).
Relations between Miami's Cuban elites and the local Black community generally are distant, or
worse. See PORTES & STEPICK, supra note 7, at 177-202 (discussing Miami's Black communities

since the Cuban influx). See also supranote 27 on Cuban demographics in Miami and the United
States.
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States because it is one of the few "little" countries that ever had the
audacity and capacity to stand up, successfully, to the United States and
its elites while under their shadow, literally, and because it did so in the
midst of a larger bifurcation: the Cold War. The Miami elites and their
foot soldiers thus have served a dual role for the government of this
country and its ruling elites: while exercising great and sometimes
definitive influence over the Cuba policy of the United States government,
they also have been used as pawns or surrogates when the United States
and its elites have elected to manipulate the exiles' rigid views of Cuba for
their own-and sometimes base-purposes. 2 It is no coincidence, after all,
that we find Miami Cubans involved in everything from the Watergate
burglary in Washington D.C. to the Contra campaign in Nicaragua.53 Thus,
the role of the United States-as represented by its formal government
agencies and driven by its Left and Right wings-has been less than
positive or benign; these North American forces lend legitimacy to their
favored camps and thereby create significant impediments to any effort
that seeks to transcend the Havana-Miami axis of conflict.
The Left in the United States, still in a hangover from the heady days
of now-broken revolutionary promises, has romanticized Havana's elites
for years. This romance effectively occludes the horrors the Havana elites
perpetrate on the people of Cuba, in particular those who seek to express
a dissenting sense of self. As a corollary, the North American Left
demonizes not only Miami's elites in ideological terms, but also in racial
and other essentialist and essentializing terms: in the Left's "progressive"
mindset, Cubans in Cuba are imagined and constructed as socially just and
principled, and their "mistakes" are unfortunate but due only to the
embargo, while Miami's Cubans are depicted as a crazy bunch of White
and spoiled members of Cuba's pre-Fidelista ruling classes.' At the same
time, the Right in the United States conversely romanticizes Miami's elites
52. See generally TORRES, supra note 5, at 127.
53. See, e.g., Alfonso Chardy, Cuban Fugitive Tied to Contras' Supply Delivery, MIAMI
HERALD, Aug. 26, 1987, at 18A; Alfonso Chardy, Mas Canosa Helped Cuban Exile Contact
Contras, Testimony Says, MIAMI HERALD, May 19, 1988, at 6A; Sandra Dibble, Who'll Help Our
Cause? CubansAskDebate ContraAid, Anti-CastroBattle, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 2, 1986, at 15A;
David Lawrence, Jr., The Man From Watergate, MIAMI HERALD, June 15, 1997, at 3L; Lourdes
Merluza, Cuban Contras Recruited in Miami, MIAMI HERALD, June 26, 1986, at I IA; Carol
Rosenberg, Plotter of Bay of Pigs. Watergate Conspirator: 'File and Forget' Castro, MIAMI
HERALD, June 28,2001, at 4A; AndresViglucci, WatergateThiefDeniesPortrayalinExile's Book,
MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 20, 1999, at 3B.
54. See generally Susana Barciela, Bashing the Cubans: The Elian Saga Prompted Open
Season on Exiles, 13 HISPANIC 128, (2000); Victor M. Diaz, Jr., The Few Liberal Voices Don't
Represent Views of Most Cuban Americans, MIAMI HERALD, May 15, 2000, at 7B; Andres
Oppenheimer, Media Bias, DismissiveLabelsAnger CubanExiles, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 6, 2000,
at 6A; Fabiola Santiago & John Dorschner, Outside Image BewildersExiles, MIAMI HERALD, Apr.
23, 2000, at 4B.
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as brave freedom fighters while demonizing Cuba and Havana in similarly
essentialist and essentializing ways: Cubans in Cuba are uniformly cast as
dictatorial devils with not even a scintilla of principle or vision. In this
way, both the Right and the Left prop up the stalemate that divides Cuba
and Cubans; for this reason, both the Left and the Right share
responsibility with Miami's and Havana's elites in the fanatical
maintenance of this tense bifurcation.
"International public opinion" similarly has helped to construct an
unproductive framework for the dueling elites ensconced in Miami and
Havana. The resolutions and reports of entities ranging from the United
Nations to Amnesty International have shown the same tendencies as the
forces within the United States: Leftist groups help to promulgate the
propaganda of Havana's elites and their allies5 while Rightist groups help
to promulgate the propaganda of Miami's elites and their allies. 5 Many
around the world therefore continue romanticizing Fidel's regime as the
"victim" of the colossus to the North and its Miami puppets, while many
others around the world romanticize the exile Cuban community and their
North American patrons as valiant upholders of democracy, freedom, and
liberty. By valorizing their respective "side" of Cuba's forced bifurcation,
they reinforce the ossified viewpoints and tensions of both Havana and
Miami-and thus help to prop them up despite their corrosive and corrupt
ways.
Thus, both "domestic" political factions and "international public
opinion" abet the Miami and Havana elites' co-construction of this
antagonistic discourse, impelling these dueling elites both with substantive
and symbolic supports that, in effect, help to drive a destructive wedge
between Cubans and other Latinas/os in the United States. Both from the
Left and the Right, the Miami elites have been encouraged structurally and
pressured politically to digress from progressive agendas on issues ranging
from affirmative action, to social welfare, to immigration policy. The
confluence of pressures from all sides has been baneful.
The Left belittles the Miami elites with ignorant indulgence and
reckless acceptance of simplistic race-class stereotypes while slighting
legitimate demands for political pluralism and personal liberty on the
island, thereby confirming and cementing diasporic fears that only the
Right will help in the vindication of these basic human rights--of course,
in exchange for the Miami elites' support of the Right agenda more
generally. 57 Rather than extend to the Miami elites a principled reason to

55. For one example, see SIMONS, supra note 10, at 33-34 (acknowledging, albeit grudgingly
but immediately exculpating the repression of human rights in Cuba by Havana's elites).

56. For one example, see HOWARD HuNT, GIVE Us THIS DAY (1973) (giving a personal
account of his involvement in CIA Cuba-related activities by the Watergate burglars).
57. An apt example is the cultivation of Cuban voters by right-wing Republicans since
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align with progressives and people of color in this country's raging culture
wars, the Left has provided many reasons for the Miami elites' (ultimately
misguided) alliance with the Right.58 Moreover, the Left's internalization
of its own dichotomous stereotypes about Cuba and Cubans has caused it
to overlook the existence and significance specifically of diasporic Cubans
who seek to transcend the internal and international politics of divide-anddestroy pursued relentlessly both from Miami and Havana. The
longstanding "progressive" essentialization and demonization of the
Miami elites in racial and class terms, coupled with the absurd valorization
of the Havana elites in political terms, thereby helps to generate and
sustain a general sociolegal climate within the United States that solidifies
the Miami elites' Rightist "domestic" tilt. This, in turn, helps to undermine
intra-Latina/o solidarity and truncate coalitional possibilities among people
of color, in myriad equality struggles that remain significantly affected by
this (mis)alignment of social groups and interests in the inter/national
politics of the United States.
Contemporaneously, the Right's essentialization and valorization of the
Miami elites as a hard-working "model minority" led by courageous
freedom fighters, coupled with the reductionist demonization of the
Havana elites as merely typical tyrants, complements this farcical yet
serious state of affairs. It is no coincidence, after all, to find Jesse Helms
and his ilk squarely in the Miami elites' ideological corner.5 9 Thus, from
both the Left and the Right, Miami's (and Havana's) elites receive external
aid and comfort that effectively undercut antisubordination struggles in
this country (and beyond it-including on the island itself). While the
resulting domestic divisions that alienate Cubans and Cuban Americans
from Latinas/os and other people of color in this country may make sense
from the selfish and ideological perspective of the Right, it is sheer folly
to do so from the principled and progressive perspective of the Left. In
both cases, however, it wreaks human havoc and is wrong.
Not surprisingly, the ripple effects of the Left's and Right's
interventions in this tragedy have had the same or similar effects in Cuba.
The Right's romance with Miami and disdain of Havana have helped to
engineer the embargo that today provides the Havana elites with a handy
pretext to disclaim responsibility for every failure or brutality that they

Ronald Reagan decided to target the Cuban vote as the only "minority" camp vulnerable to
Republican blandishments. See generally William Schneider, Elian Gonzalez Defeated Al Gore.
33 NAT'L J. 1274 (2001).

58. Whether "cause" or "effect," the Miami Cuban community generally is described as

"conservative," especially when compared to other Latina/o communities. See, e.g., Mark Falcoff
& Elliot Abrams, The Other Cuba, 47 NAT'L REv. 34 (1995). See generally Gerald P. Lopez,
Symposium, Learning About Latinos, 19 UCLA CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. 363 (1999).
59. See TORRES, supranote 5, at 144-47 (discussing the effects of the American right).
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perpetrate, and which makes credible to some "observers" the lame
excuses offered by Havana elites for their stubborn, decades-long
suppression of political diversity on the island.' Over time and into the
present, the Right's promotion of measures to leverage and tighten the
embargo has helped to enable the Havana elites' concoction of a paranoid
siege mentality on the island that has provided the chief excuse for their
unending infliction of dictatorship."' While the Right decidedly bears
partial responsibility for the misery and suffering they have licensed on the
island, the Left's romance with Havana also has provided the trappings of
credibility for the Havana elites' blatant tyranny. The Left's willingness
to justify unabashed oppression as an operational necessity of a revolution
long ago dead has made it complicit in the Havana elites' systematic and
barbaric mistreatment of Cubans on the island seeking only to claim,
secure, and enjoy basic rights and options similar to those that progressives
regularly demand for themselves as well as for "subordinated groups"
around the globe. Thus, both from the Left and the Right, Havana's elites
have been encouraged politically and pressured structurally to
compromise, and effectively to abandon, the progressive agendas they
mapped for their revolution four decades ago.
In sum, the Left's romance with Havana and disdain for Miami have
produced the same net effect here as the Right's romance with Miami and
disdain for Havana have produced over there: the Right's partisan
promotion ofthe Miami elites' agenda nonetheless has allowed the Havana
elites to exacerbate and exploit the fears and concerns of Cubans on the
island as a means of maintaining their corrupt control, while the Left's
partisan promotion of the Havana elites' agenda ironically has allowed the
Miami elites to excite and exaggerate diasporic fervor and fanaticism. In
both cases, the Right and the Left have incited and consolidated the elites'
60. See id.
61. See Georgie Anne Geyer, Ending the Cuban Embargo Would Perpetuate Castro's
TotalitarianControl,CHI. TIuB., July 7,2000, at N15; see also Holger Jensen, After FourDecades,
Has Embargo Against Cuba Worked?, CAPITOL HILL BLUE, Mar. 13, 2001; AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION FOR WORLD HEALTH, "DENIAL OF FOOD AND MEDICINE: THE IMPACT OF THE U.S.
EMBARGO ON HEALTH AND NUTRITION IN CUBA," March 1997, available at

http://www.CubaSolidarity.net/aawh.html; U.S. Department ofState: Washington File, Text: Bush
Announces Strengthening of Measures Dealing with Cuba (July 13, 2001), available at
http://www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/us-cuba/bushl 3.htm; James Cox, US. ponders more
aggressiveCuba policy ifHelms-Burton law is invoked, lawsuits, troubles with tradingpartners
couldincreaserapidly,USA TODAY, Apr. 18, 2001, at 3B; U.S. Department of State: Washington
File, Powell says Cuban Sanctions Should Remain in Place (Mar. 15, 2001), available at
http://www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/us-cubalpowelll5.htm; U.S. Department of State:
Washington File, US. Ambassador Cunningham Remarks on Cuba Embargo at UN. (Nov. 9,
2000), availableat http://www.usinfo.state.gov/ regional/ar/us-cuba/cuba9.htm; Deborah Kalb, 3
Cuban-American lawmakers standfirm against loosening embargo on Cuba, GANNETT NEWS
SERVICE, Mar. 13, 1998.
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worst fears and regressive political tendencies, simultaneously enhancing
both camps' moral and material resources to wage, year after year, decade
after decade, their unjust war against each other and most importantly, at
the expense of the Cuban people's human rights and historical aspirations.
The net effect of these interventions, both over here and over there, is to
reinforce rigidity, license impunity, and inflame conflict. It is way past
time to recognize that both kinds of essentialization, valorization, and
demonization are false, exploitative, and destructive.
D. Time andImagination: Toward the Denied
Despite the patent falsity of the dichotomy that island and diasporic
elites have co-created and propped up since 1959, their ruthless tactics
have helped them both to establish and enjoy their social, legal, economic,
and political prerogatives over their respective preserves. They have
accumulated and marshaled tremendous resources of all kinds, which they
now activate and orchestrate to wage their respective parts of this global
public relations campaign. Through their respective resources and
positioning they have occupied center-stage in public discourse, centering
themselves in the public eye as (re)presenting "Cuba" and "Cubans."
Through their resources, and because of their converging interests in
stalemate, they opportunistically have co-produced suspenseful displays
of life and death, of law and society, and of politics and passion, that from
time to time have entertained and riveted the world. The Bay of Pigs in
1961, the Pedro Pan Airlift ofthe 1960s, the Freedom Flights of the 1970s,
the Mariel Exodus of 1980, the Venceremos Brigades, Fidel's fantastical
orations at the Plaza de la Revolucion, the Brothers-to-the-Rescue
dogfights and shootdowns, the Elian immigration controversy of 19992000: these inter/national moments of Cuban struggle present but a few of
the instances that constitute this long-running, high-ratings coproduction
of Havana's and Miami's elites. 2 Through these opportunities for
theatrics, both camps and their political allies in the United States and
internationally, slowly but surely have choreographed skewed perceptions
that they have hoped, as they still do, eventually will yield favored
realities. The high drama and visibility accorded to these bipolar elites and
their skirmishes have ingrained their images as the dualistic parameters of
national choice in the imagination of Cubans here and there, as well as
among the inter/national public more generally. Today, Cuba and Cubans
effectively are pushed to choose between these two "communities" and
their structures of oppression as all-or-nothing alternatives frozen in time.

62. For a good overview and analysis of this period, see
WITH OPEN ARMS: CUBAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES
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The push remains powerful, but time stands still for no one and
nothing. While today's elites were consolidating their power and positions,
Cuba and Cubans caught in the riptides of their bipolar extremes also have
dared to resist and reject both. They-we-have dared to imagine
possibilities denied both from here and there.
Indeed, Cuba and Cubans never have limited our visions of the possible
to the options offered by these two camps: from the inception of today's
bipolar paradigm, Cubans have dared to imagine a future plagued neither
by political oppression nor by economic exploitation-I know so because
it was precisely this capacity for imagination, and yearning to make it real,
that caused my father both to support Fidelismo initially and to flee its
tightening grip as a political and economic refugee just a few years later.
I have learned since then that his example, while personal to me, was
neither unique nor rare in the early days of Fidelismo-nor now. 63 Yet, the
vision harbored by my father and others like him has been overshadowed
during these years, as the elites of Havana and Miami entrenched
themselves and eliminated systematically the immediate visibility or
viability of any intermediate approach to the project of building a Cuba
that, for the first time in Cuban history, would repudiate substantively the
traditional stratification of Cuban society and combat proactively the
perpetuation of post/neo-colonial subordination under Euroheteropatriarchy.'A
In so doing, these elites effectively have collaborated on a project in
which both are fundamentally invested: the denial of the possibilities,
imagined by persons like my father, that evoke the ideals imagined by the
earlier revolutionaries in Cuba-those who fought to tear away Spain's
imperial yoke and to replace it with an egalitarian society, and those who
even later sought to conclude Cuba's historic waves of uprisings with the
establishment of the 1940 Constitution. 65 In their joint project to deny this
possibility, Havana's elites long have imprisoned anyone who sought
seriously to articulate a vision of Cuba in which everyday people enjoyed
personal and political freedoms as part of the project of building a
postcolonial nation-state, while Miami elites long have harassed anyone
who sought seriously to pursue social justice rather than gross economic
enrichment as the endgoal of the nation-state. 66 Both elites intolerantly
have labeled as "enemy" and targeted for vicious attacks anyone who has
sought to delineate a vision in which all three generations of human rights

63. See FAGEN Er AL, supra note 15, at 62-97.
64. In some ways, this would vindicate the original revolutions against Spain, which were
fought in the name of egalitarian reforms. See generally LEONARD, supra note 17, at 81-83, 153-54;
SIMONS, supra note 10, at 157-59.
65. See CARLOS M. PIEDRA YPIEDRA, LA CONSTITUCION Y ELTRIBUNAL SUPREMO (1943).
66. See, e.g., supra notes 36 and 37 on the use of political violence in Miami.
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would be respected not only formally, but also in fact. Both on the island
and throughout the diaspora, ideologically opposed elites insist selfrighteously, but increasingly unconvincingly, that either Cuba and Cubans
go their way or no way. The selfish interests of both elites have converged,

perversely, in the joint construction and maintenance of today's conflicted
and polarized status quo, a scenario that protects little else than the two
elites' own creature comforts and their status systems and symbols.
But, in this, their sole collaborative project, the two elites have failed,
and it remains only for time to confirm their joint and ultimate failure. The
elites on both sides of the Florida Straits have failed because they have not
been able to erase the vision of, or still the yearning for, social justice and
personal liberty, both on the island and throughout the diaspora. Both on
the island and throughout the diaspora, Cubans are working toward
principled yet aspirational projects, awaiting and inviting the day in which
the joint project of today's dominant elites will crumble of its own weight.
And for this reason, the self-serving fantasies and politics of both sets of
elites are doomed. Neither time nor knowledge favors them: though both
elites have managed to suppress or occlude the manifestation of these
visions and yearnings, dissidents on both sides of the Straits continue to
show us that repression from both sides has succeeded in neither.
On the island, for instance, a group called "La Patria Es de Todos
Cubanos" (The Whole Land Belongs to All Cubans) only recently issued
a manifesto that rejects the "deal" imposed by Fidelismo, insisting instead
that Cuba and Cubans need not forsake-should not and cannot
forsake-political pluralism and individual agency in exchange for social
and economic justice.67 They insist, instead, on a national pursuit both of
social justice and political freedom. And these dissidents clearly are not
alone.6" In refusing submission, these and other dissenters have incurred
67. See The Homeland Belongs to Us All, CUBANET NEwS, Aug. 1, 2001. See also supra
notes 17, 18, 25, and 35 on political control and dissidence under Fidel's government.
68. A prime example of another dissident movement is the Varela Project, which collected
a sufficient number of petitions calling for democratic decentralization of power in claimed
satisfaction of the Cuban Constitution's procedure for presenting petitions to the government for
legislative consideration. The Varela Project gained attention when Jimmy Carter mentioned it
during his visit to the island in 2002; previously, the government had suppressed news of the
dissidents' petition drive. See Cubans Want to Know Text of Varela Project, supra note 48

(describing the Varela Project and Carter's visit). In a response that effectively serves as a
caricature of the Havana elites, the government promptly reported that 99% of the entire
population-over eight million people-had turned out to vote on a counter petition proposed by
the political machines of Havana's elites. This turnout was described as "spontaneous" despite the
government's public orchestration of this spectacle. And in a coincidence that might be described
as miraculous, all eight million Cubans voted the same way: as their elites had proposed, the
island's masses agreed that the status quo should be declared "untouchable" as a matter of formal
law. See Vanessa Bauza, Cuba s Pro-SocialistPetitionDriveSteamrolls Varela Project,ORLANDO
SENT NEL, June 24, 2002, at A 1l. Within a week, in a move reminiscent of corrupt rulers enacting
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personally the wrath of Havana's elites and their apparati of brute
oppression."'
In Miami, in similar fashion, a new generation of Cubans and Cuban
Americans has begun to emerge, and to dissent from the orthodoxies of the
local elites.70 This generation comprises Cuban children who, like me,
arrived in the diaspora while very young, as well as Cuban Americans
born in the diaspora after their parent's flight from the island; like our
counterparts on the island, we view the politics and trajectories of "being
Cuban" from a broader and more critical perspective, and we decidedly do
not see ourselves--or our nation-as necessarily invested in the outcome
of the Cold War still being waged from Havana and Miami. As our island
counterparts, this new generation does not envision human rights and

social policy as a zero-sum game, in which we are forced to elect between
some rights and forego other freedoms-or to buy into an Orwellian
mindset where rights and violations are transposed by fiat.7' We do not
see, and affirmatively reject, the proposition that humans are unable to
pursue, simultaneously and as a nation-state, all three generations of
human rights in authentic and concrete terms. As in Cuba, this
nonconformance to prevailing orthodoxies instigates their repressive
retaliations, ranging from social exclusion and public vilification to
personal denigration and physical intimidation. On both sides of the
Florida Straits, the dominant elites do their best to keep a tight lid on
things, using whatever means of power they can grab at the moment.
This assessment is neither facile nor partisan. In naming the fate of this
perverse strategic collaboration I do not seek to invoke simplistic notions
of Fidel's death or fall followed by a quick and happy return to a false
desperate measures in the shadow of their reign's imminent end, the national Assembly had duly
amended the Constitution's text to formally declare the current elites' status perpetually
"irrevocable." See Vanessa Bauza, Government Responds to Varela Project with Show of Unity,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 1, 2002, at A 1l. This response, however, has not stifled dissent; on the
contrary, dissident groups continue to proliferate despite the "unity" and apparent unanimity
claimed by the Havana elites. See Vanessa Bauza, New Opposition Document Comes Soon After
Varela Project, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 26, 2002, at A13.
69. See The Right to Dissent Nonexsitent in Cuba, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 22, 1999, at 20A;

Anita Snow, With tough sentences, Cuban attacks dissent, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 16, 1999, at A 15;
Juan 0. Tamayo, Cuba Takes Aim at Dissent, Crime Legislation Casts a Wide Net, MIAMI HERALD,
Feb. 16, 1999, at IA; Juan 0. Tamayo, Crackdown on Dissent Raises Questions About Castro's
Motives, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 19, 1999, at 16A. See also supranotes 17, 18,25, and 35 on tyranny
in Cuba.
70. See Anne MoncreiffArrarte, The quiet rise of the wcas' in America, 106 U.S. NEws &
WORLD REP. 41 (1989); Constable, supra note 36; LEONARD, supra note 17, at 88. See also supra
note 25 on generational shifts within CANF.
71. One relevant indicant of this "new generation" is the participation of Cuban and CubanAmerican scholars in LatCrit Theory. See, e.g., Berta Esperanza Hernfindez-Truyol, On Becoming
the Other: Cubans, Castroand Elian-LaCriticalAnalysis,78 DENy. U.L. REV. 687 (2001).
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halcyon. The future of Cuba and Cubans is bound to be complex and
volatile-and both elites are striving mightily to make sure it is so. On the
one hand, Miami's elites busy themselves with new charters and model
codes to effectuate their version of a transition to a conventionally
capitalist democracy-having been dispossessed in both political and
material terms, they seek a return on both levels and on their terms, as if
time had stood still, or could be rolled back." On the other hand, Havana's
elites brace themselves for the day when they no longer can depend on the
mystique of their supreme leader to buttress the hierarchies that privilege
them-having long ago abandoned the principles of their revolution to
real-world pressures and self-interested agendas, this mystique and its
strategic activation, backed up ofcourse by ever-efficient policing, are key
to holding their morally and fiscally bankrupt regime together. In some
respects, Havana's elites must be fearing the inexorable passage of time
most of all.73 Both camps, seeking to use time to their advantage, now are
working feverishly to retain, and perhaps expand, their positions of status
and accumulations of wealth as they prepare for the inevitable death of the
man who has engineered so much of this tension and tragedy.
However, I also do not seek with this forecast to validate the equally
simplistic notion that Fidel's inevitable date with mortality will leave his
cultist orthodoxy and its apparati of social control substantially unaffected.
Removing Fidel from the equation can make all the difference in the
worlds of the island and the diaspora. Fidel, like other original leaders,
commands a unique veneration and obedience within the island because
of his unique role in the history ofthe rise to power of Havana's dominant
elites and their installation in government. Because of this history and
positionality, Fidel's words do carry a unique force on the island-for
better or worse. 4 But Fidelismo has been internalized by many Cubans
throughout the island over the years, and as an ideology it does have a
certain substantive coherence: while it cannot justify his cultist
dictatorship, Fidel's critique of neoliberal corporate globalization is
cogent, and it can serve as an insightful contribution to antisubordination

72. See generally Ian Ball, US Forces on Standby for Castro's Death, SUNDAY TEL., July 15,
200 1, at 29; Dana Canedy, On Land and Sea, Florida Plans for Turmoil After Castro's Death, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 2, 2001, at Al. See also LEONARD, supra note 17, at 87.
73. This point was driven home recently, when Fidel fainted during one of his multi-hour
harangues, drawing attention to the unease on the island and among its rulers over the fate of their
jefe. See Reuters, Castro Wilts under the Sun, N.Y. TIMEs, June 24,2001, § 1, at 6; Vanessa Bauza,
Castro's Fainting Spell Stirs Speculation About Cuba's Course, Next Leader, CHI. TRIB., June 25,
2001, at 3; Charles Piggott, What if Castro Died?, 12 WORLD LINK 112 (1999), available at
http://www.backissues.worldlink. co.uk.articles/10l 19917 1232.htm.
74. See LEONARD, supra note 17, at 88; Envision Cuba Without Castro, CHI. TRIB., July 25,
2001, at 18.
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discourse and inter/national policymaking." Thus, Fidel's unavoidable
demise is unlikely to mean the automatic dissolution of Cuba's
governmental infrastructure and disappearance of its reigning ideology,
but it does close a singular chapter in the continuing history of Cuba and
Cubans-a chapter that, given the mutual intransigence of Havana's and
Miami's elites, apparently cannot be concluded until then. After that point,
I hope, believe, and trust that the following chapters of this continuing

story will be written, in part, by Cubans on the island and Cubans in the
diaspora, both equally and mutually devoted to Cuban reconciliation on
egalitarian, antisubordination, and anti-essentialist principles.

E. Broken Promisesand Bottom Lines: Human Rights,
Cuban Rights
Cuba and Cubans face a Hobson's choice, and both "alternatives" look
alike--literally, and demographically. Moreover, both demand abject
subordination in social, economic, and political terms to self-anointed
elites. Ultimately, both "choices" are fundamentally flawed in common yet
different ways: both promise to Cuba and Cubans the vindication of
important human rights for the forfeiture of others. Neither promises a
post-subordination society.
In some key respects, this Hobson's choice conceptually reflects the
structure of human rights as they generally have been conceived and
organized internationally during the second half of the Twentieth
Century-roughly the same period of time during which Havana and
Miami have erected themselves as the mirror images through which Cuba
and Cubans are gazed. During this time, international covenants have
recognized "three generations" of human rights: (1) "civil and political"
rights that, like due process, freedom of conscience, and freedom of
association, generally require governments to refrain from interfering with
an individual's right to participate in civil society or the political process;
(2) "economic, social, and cultural" rights that seek to secure the elemental
components of basic individual well-being and development, such as
access to food, housing, education, health care, employment, and
participation in the cultural life of the community; and (3) "solidarity and
self-determination" rights, which focus on the collective needs of
individuals as groups and that include principally the right of a people to
choose their own government and, additionally, rights to development,
peace, and a healthy environment."' Their precise contents of course

75. See supra note 13 on Fidel's political critique of global power arrangements.
76. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Beyond Civil Rights: Considering "Third Generation"
InternationalHuman Rights Law in the UnitedStates, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 387 (1997).
See also Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Foreword-International
Law, Human Rights andLatCritTheory,
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remain indeterminate and contested, and to a large extent these rights are
honored globally mostly in the breach." Nevertheless, these rights are
conceived as "indivisible" and "interdependent"--they not only are not
susceptible to a cherry-picking approach but they positively depend
mutually on each other for their social efficacy."8 This general framework
thus provides a ready point of departure for a critical and comparative
assessment of the Cuba promised to Cubans both by Havana's and
Miami's Cuban elites.79
When we step back from the rhetoric of self-justification that envelopes
the thinking of both camps' adherents, we can begin to see how island
elites effectively demand that Cuba and Cubans forsake "first generation"
human rights in exchange for "second generation" human rights while
diasporic elites demand the exact opposite. Neither is overtly cognizant of,
nor overly friendly to, third generation group rights-especially those
relating to the right of self-determination. Indeed, the totalitarian and
authoritarian Cuban regimes in Havana and Miami violate in spirit and in
fact the right of the Cuban people to self-determination as a nation, for
neither set of elites has shown any serious disposition to let Cuba or
Cubans get them out of power and off our backs.
In this scheme, Havana's elites continue pointing to their health and
education initiatives, as if bringing better health and expanded awareness
to people-a laudable accomplishment-could substitute for, be
reconciled with, or justify the simultaneous denial of a people's right or
ability to employ that health and awareness for personally chosen rather
than bureaucratically dictated endeavors or projects. Havana's elites, in
effect, boast of their selectively displayed commitment to a more educated
and healthy population as if such a population then could not be trusted to
28U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 177 (1997); Berta Esperanza Hernindez-Truyol, BuildingBridges:
Bringing International Human Rights Home, 9 LA RAZA L.i. 69 (1996). See generally
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INCONTExT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS (Henry J. Steiner & Philip

Alston eds., 1996).
77. See generally Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of
State, 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 6-7 (2000), available at

http://www.state.gov.www/global/human-rights/1999.hrp.report/99hrp.toc.html.
78. See supra note 76 on international law and human rights.
79. Of course, the human rights framework is not the only-perhaps not even the
best-template to use in deconstructing--and escaping-the dead-end view each camp has of the
other, and that both foist on Cuba and Cubans. This formal, imperfect template cannot capture
every nuance relating to Cuba and Cubans-nor do I seek to do so in this Essay. Rather, the human
rights framework serves here, simply, as one useful lens through which we might access in
relatively concrete terms the possibility of another, or alternative, way toward the reconciliation
of Cubans and the reconstruction of Cuba on positively egalitarian, antisubordination principles.
In this Essay, Iuse the human rights template only as an example that partially illustrates how and
why the two doctrinaire visions ofCuba pushed by the two sets of dominant elites are substantively
wanting-and fatally so.
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manage its own affairs in a politically plural and economically
decentralized social order. Miami's elites, meanwhile, rely on neoliberal
capitalist platitudes about "hard work" and "opportunity" to justify
structural neglect of poverty and related social ills, including lack of
proper education and health care based on economic class, as if political
or expressive "freedom" could cure or comfort the sick and starving.
Miami's elites, in effect, have been content to go along with the
quintessentially elitist blame-game that pities the poor but finds the cause
for their lot in their own individual failures-after all, "they" like "us" are
"free" to "work hard" and "get ahead" in this "land of opportunity." Cuba
and Cubans thus are under coercive pressure from both elites to relinquish,
indeed to renounce and forget about, basic rights that international
agreements recognize and promise to all humans. While this nutshell
description necessarily oversimplifies, it also captures a fundamental
aspect of the current stalemate between Havana's and Miami's vision of
Cuba: both visions explicitly compromise the indivisibility of human
rights and, as applied, both visions also methodically subvert their
interdependence. The Hobson's choice offered by both elites is distilled to
social justice versus personal freedom, but never both.
Nonetheless, both camps indeed do proffer compelling goals and
values. Both camps exude not only fear and insecurity, but also idealistic
aspirations. And no intellectually honest reason exists for denying it. No
good reason exists to deny or denigrate either the incisiveness of Fidel's
anti-capitalist analysis in the pursuit of international social justice or the
importance of the exiles' insistence on political freedom as a fundamental
condition of post-subordination society."0 But neither Fidel's social justice
insights nor the exiles' focus on personal and political freedom can justify
their subordinationist transgressions "at home": on Fidel's part, this
objection includes the brutal oppression of dissenting voices and systemic
acquiescence to Euroheteropatriarchy, and on the exiles' part, it includes
their ready acceptance of "free enterprise" gospels to justify similarly
Euroheteropatriarchal structures, precepts, or legacies. In this stalemated
scheme, each set of elites offers to Cuba and Cubans something
compelling, but both attach unconscionable-and unacceptable--strings:
both camps adamantly insist that the vindication of preferred rights must
mean the formal and actual surrender--even wholesale violation---of other
human rights; or, in the alternative, they demand from us an Orwellian
pretension that violations are rights, and that lies are truths.
This stalemated scheme neither concedes, tolerates, nor wishes Cuba
and Cubans to imagine the possibility of a social and legal order in which

80. For an excellent example, see Berta Esperanza Hemndez-Truyol, Out in Left Field:
Cuba's Post-Cold War Strikeout, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 15 (1994).
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Cuba and Cubans forsake no human rights but secure and protect them
equally for all. Showing themselves decidedly more interested in selfpreservation than in national reconciliation, both camps righteously
continue to sow the seeds of enduring suspicion and discord on both sides
of the Florida Straits among Cubans already conditioned (poisoned?) by
both sides' extended bombardment of hypocritical misinformation and
hyperbolic invective. In the tradition of the "Big Lie," both have
collaborated in the perpetration of a massive and fanatical campaign to
make us and the world believe that their self-interested versions of Cuba
and Cubans really comprise the only, or best, options toward a
postcolonial, post-subordination reconstruction of Cuban society. While
both pontificate about the benefits they offer, their aim is to consolidate
power and privilege by selling to the Cuban nation an incomplete bill of
human rights as Cuban rights.
F. Reconciliationand Reconstruction: Five LatCritExhortations
Many moons may pass before reconciliation and reconstruction come
to pass, but pass they shall. Human mortality, and the enduring limits of
medical magic, ensure it. The challenge for those of us who seek to pursue
a post-subordination order in Cuba is to avoid until then a firm
identification with, or internalization of, the inflammatory propaganda
generated from either camp or its followers. The challenge is to sift
through the records, ideals, and limits of each to learn from both, and to be
duped by the seductions of neither. The challenge is to distinguish the
"good" from the "bad" in both instances-and toward a combination of
both-and more that could provide a principled sociolegal transformation
toward Cuba's progressive emancipation from all forms of oppression. The
challenge is to lay a solid foundation for the work that will make it
possible for Cuba and Cubans to chart a consensual path toward social
justice andpolitical pluralism once the circumstances permit it, a path cut
by antisubordination principles rather than by the selfish imperatives of
one established elite or another. In this spirit, I conclude with five basic
points offered here as LatCrit exhortations:
1. Stay Independent of the PrevalentBipolaritiesand Their
Politicsof Oppression.This first point, obviously, restates the
above admonition and provides a basic threshold toward
reconciliation and reconstruction. This admonition bears
exhortation because it is crucial as a method: without a
conscious and conscientious commitment to this
independence, we simply cannot sustain our capacity to
imagine and pursue the possibilities-to imagine and pursue
a post-subordination vision that transcends the limitations
imposed by the bents of Havana's and Miami's elites.
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Without independence of viewpoint, we progressively
compromise our ability to attain and sustain a critical (and
self-critical) stance toward the postures and emissions of both
bipolar elites-a stance that is necessary to deconstructing the
status quo as a first step toward imagining a reconstructed
social order.
2. Insist on Critical(andSelf-Critical)Approaches to Cuban
Reconciliationand Reconstruction. The second point flows

from the first, and it also relates to method. Rather than
envelop ourselves in sentimental romanticisms about either
of the bipolar narratives of Cuban histories and hopes, we
must insist instead on critical (and self-critical) analysis of
power relations, and of the antisubordination ramifications of
actions and policies undertaken both in Havana and in Miami
(as well as elsewhere). Sentimentalism-fawning over either
set of elites or indulging our idiosyncratic (pre)dispositions
toward them-most likely will impair deconstructive, as well
as reconstructive, analysis and praxis, and thus inhibit our
capacity for envisioning, as capaciously as possible, the
design of a post-subordination, postcolonial era in Cuba.
Without a genuine commitment to criticality and
independence, we cannot hope to pierce through the powerful
and entrenched cosmologies that have been concocted and
enacted on both sides of the Florida Straits so assiduously
since 1959.
3. Frame Reconciliation and Reconstruction Around
Egalitarian Vindication of the "Three Generations" of

Human Rights. This point relies on the broad assortment of
international convenants, and their ultimate human rights
aspirations, as a general-even partial-but nonetheless
substantive source for the development of a postcolonial,
post-subordination social and legal order in Cuba. While
patently limited and breached routinely worldwide, this
formal international human rights model repudiates as a
substantive matter key demands of both elites: that the Cuban
people effectively and formally abandon the hope and pursuit
of a national community dedicated in principle, as well as in
fact, to all three of the rights "generations" conceived thus far
by humanity. This third LatCrit exhortation instead affirms
the global notion that all human rights are "interdependent"
and "indivisible" and asserts that a principled and actual
vindication of allhuman rights for all humans is the only path
toward a post-subordination, postcolonial Cuba. And because
it provides an approach to reconstruction that is independent
of either elites' ideological delimitations, this international
rights framework also helps to provide a substantive anchor
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for the first point-this third exhortation, in other words,
shifts from method to substance, and does not preclude in any
way the use of other substantive sources for the design of
Cuban reconciliation and reconstruction along antisubordinationist lines. Substantively, then, this third
exhortation points to a forthright rejection of both elites and
their agendas; an egalitarian vindication of human rights vis,-vis Cuba and Cubans calls for the elimination both of the
embargo and of Fidel's monopoly on social, economic, and
political life in the island. This point beckons Cuba and
Cubans to take a substantively independent approach toward
national reconciliation and reconstruction based on
international sources and developments that transcend the
Miami-Havana scripts for our common future.
4. Commit to the Project of Reconciliation and
Reconstruction and to the Proactive Social and Legal
DismantlingofEuroheteropatriarchy.The fourth exhortation
takes the substantive commitment of egalitarian
reconciliation and reconstruction further, calling for aspecific
commitment to the dismantlement of a particular sociolegal
ideology, which has been and continues to be hegemonic in
Cuban society and culture. While the national reconciliation
project beneficially may be framed, at least partially, around
the three generations of human rights as a general and
independent grounding, the project must be focused
specifically on the dismantlement of Euroheteropatriarchy
because the structures, imperatives, and agents of this
particular ideology are, in Cuba and among Cubans, key and
pervasive sources of subordination that systematically deny
rights to nonconforming persons and projects while
systematically promoting conforming persons and projects.
Because this pernicious ideology still accounts for so much
of Havana's and Miami's sociolegal architecture, the antisubordination reconstruction of Cuba as a post-subordination
society requires us to focus consciously and explicitly on the
material dismantlement and social disablement of
Euroheteropatriarchy.
5. Demand Disgorgementof Unjust Riches and Reallocation
of Social Goods as Integral to Cuba's Reconstruction as a
Post-subordinationSociety. This fifth and final exhortation
presents perhaps the most difficult hurdle, but it flows
directly from the prior four. This point recognizes a bottom
line learned from prior antisubordination experience: that
social justice, if it is to be more than a cynical platitude,
hinges on social transformation-even if orderly and
incremental. Transformation, in turn, denotes and requires an
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actual reallocation of social goods; transformation without
disgorgement and reallocation is but another "Big Lie." The
disgorgement of unjust past gains, and the reallocation of
existing and future social goods, no doubt will entail a long
and arduous process of national dialogue as part of the
reconciliation project. These redistributive efforts also will
require creative negotiation of myriad interests and conflicts.
But without confronting the past and present maldistribution
of social goods and economic assets on the island as a
structural source of widespread misery, the resilient legacies
of Euroheteropatriarchal colonialism will continue to bedevil
Cuba and Cubans. The objective-and challenge-is to
ground our approach to and resolution of these issues in
egalitarian antisubordination principles and communitybuilding values. Though exceedingly difficult to accomplish
due to the perpetual problem of entrenched and reactionary
interests, this final LatCrit exhortation nonetheless is
indispensable to reconstructing Cuba as a post-subordination
society that repudiates in fact, rather than merely in words,
the enduring material and cultural manifestations of its
post/neo/colonial histories and legacies.
These five points obviously are not, and are not proffered here as, a
panacea. On the contrary, these exhortations serve only as a point of
departure for a reciprocal and open dialogue toward reconciliation and
reconstruction. As a set, they identify some difficult issues that, for some
time, may even be intractable-especially if the dominant elites continue
to have their way most of the time.
These five LatCrit exhortations recognize the daunting nature of the
enterprise and work, therefore, to root it in substantive social justice
commitments that usefully may help to inform the conception and
negotiation of reconciliation and reconstruction. Rather than posit a
nebulous ideal or ultimate fantasy, these points and exhortations can serve
as one antisubordinationist and anti-essentialist basis with which Cubans
collaboratively may begin to delineate an agenda for a "reunion" of the
island and the diaspora without structurally or ideologically preadvantaging any subset of "Cubans"-or the unilateral customs that may
have been instilled amongst us during this nearly half century of division
and divisiveness. Though susceptible to manipulation, these points and
exhortations can provide some common ground for a discourse of
reconciliation, and the project of reconstruction, among and between
Cubans there, here, and elsewhere around the globe. If pursued earnestly
and cooperatively, these points may yet provide a sturdy platform and
flexible framework for the development of a postcolonial society built on
substantive and principled antisubordination commitments rather than on
broken promises or selfish interests.
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II. CONCLUSION

My father is now ninety-one years old and declining steadily. Bemused
at having witnessed the dawn of a new millennium, my father knows that
he never will see his vision of a "free" Cuba materialize in his homeland.
But he and others like him, whether on the island, here, or elsewhere on
the globe, have planted seeds of principle and vision that continue to
flower and blossom. The future is not his, nor is it Fidel's or his
adversaries'-it is, instead, ours: Cubans at the margins of this century's
dichotomies, who are captive neither to Miami nor to Havana, and who
seek instead a principled alternative to both.
If ever you visit either of my two hometowns during this era of
diaspora and deadlock--and as you enjoy their local delights, including
their respective versions of Cuban cuisine and culture-look around you
for subtle signs of the histories and hopes sketched above, and you will see
them. In this way, you may begin to navigate for yourself the slivers of
unoccupied space that exist stubbornly between the bipolar narratives
urged upon you from Miami and Havana. In this way, and over time, you
may become able to help us-Cubans there and here-to navigate
successfully the treacherous shoals of contention and manipulation that
have co-enabled the elites here and there jointly to keep Cubans apart
while we remain a nation.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

35

Florida Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 11

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol55/iss1/11

36

